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Homeland security is in a pre-paradigm phase. We understand this to mean that unlike 
medicine, law, engineering, and other professional disciplines, there is no general conceptual 
agreement about the range of topics that constitute homeland security as a field of study. 
Consequently there is not a dominant approach to teaching homeland security. We happen to 
think this is a good thing.1 
 
Whether one defines “homeland security” as a discipline, activity, programmatic 
approach, or a national security objective, “learning” homeland security is a new 
endeavor.2 The scope of the task is particularly daunting when added to the 
“normal” responsibilities borne by senior state and local officials. Not only must 
they address the tactical and operational components of what we are calling 
homeland security, but they must master the more complex policy, strategy, and 
organizational design issues as well. Further, the relative infancy of homeland 
security as a public policy issue, and its constant and rapid evolution in concept 
and implementation, is a significant complicating factor. 
How can senior state and local leaders learn the basics of an evolving doctrine 
and strategy, and how can they apply it in their own jurisdictions? The National 
Strategy for Homeland Security clearly states that homeland security is a 
“shared responsibility” between states, localities, and the private sector.3 It 
further sets the stage by posing four critical questions: (1) What is “homeland 
security” and what missions does it entail? (2) What do we seek to accomplish, 
and what are the most important goals of homeland security? (3) What is the 
federal executive branch doing now to accomplish these goals and what should it 
do in the future? (4) What should non-federal governments, the private sector, 
and citizens do to help secure the homeland?4  
These are the questions governors, mayors, councilmen, legislators, 
commissioners, fire chiefs, police chiefs, and others should be asking the national 
leadership, themselves, and their organizations. More critically, nearly five years 
after the attacks of 9/11 and four years after the National Strategy’s publication, 
state and local governments should be well on the way to having clear answers to 
these questions, as well as having organized to implement the solutions. Some 
have, some have not, and many are still struggling with the questions, let alone 
the answers.  
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The intent of this article is to discuss one means of moving from the questions 
posed above to specific actions that will ultimately achieve better safety and 
security in the face of twenty-first-century terrorist threats. Does this approach 
help move senior leaders from the exploratory analysis of “what is homeland 
security” to a state where politically, organizationally, and socially acceptable 
programs and processes better protect and secure their constituencies? The 
purpose of this essay is not to study, graph and compare what the nation’s states 
and cities have achieved in “homeland security.” Nor is it to analyze potential 
methodologies for providing executive level education. This article describes and 
discusses the Executive Education Program developed by the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) and the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for 
Homeland Defense and Security (NPS/CHDS.) It will discuss the need for an 
executive education program for senior state and local officials; the methodology 
used by DHS and NPS/CHDS to present concepts and subjects for discussion to 
this audience; and an anecdotal assessment of what has been learned since the 
program’s inception in January 2003. But before this discussion begins, it is 
important to provide a very brief overview of the program. 
 
TYPES OF EXECUTIVE EDUCATION SESSIONS 
The NPS/CHDS program provides three types of sessions, differing mostly by 
topic or by audience. The program was first tasked by the Department of 
Homeland Security to deliver policy and strategic level seminars to governors and 
their cabinets or homeland security “teams.” The original purpose was to prepare 
state officials to take on the new policy, strategy, and organizational design issues 
that homeland security presented. These sessions are commonly referred to as 
“state” METs. (MET is an acronym for Mobile Education Team.) While the 
content of these METs has evolved over time, their overriding focus continues to 
be the prevention of terrorist attacks, the policies of homeland security (both 
federal and state), and the issues that would arise with the response and recovery 
to catastrophic events.  
The second type of session is provided to leaders in major urban areas; thus 
while similar in content to the sessions held for states, their audience 
composition and themes for discussion differ. The audience composition in major 
urban areas varies from city to city; some include many elected officials and 
minimal staff, while others may have one or two elected officials and more 
department heads. An urban area seminar may also take either a “wide” or a 
“deep” approach. The wide approach is one where the multiple jurisdictions that 
make up the greater urban area are represented; the deeper approach is more 
focused on the agencies and disciplines within the core city or county. Those 
jurisdictions choosing width in their focus have a greater intergovernmental 
discussion while those selecting depth generally focus more heavily on the details 
of interagency challenges and opportunities. 
The third type of executive education session, the topical MET, is focused on a 
single issue or is delivered to a non-jurisdictional entity such as a national 
association. These events are designed to explore the policy, strategic, and 
organizational infrastructures as they might apply to a specific hazard (e.g. 
pandemic flu), an existing or evolving national policy or strategy (e.g. fusion 
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centers), or a single topic for further exploration and/or resolution (e.g. public 
and private sector interfaces). These events tend to vary greatly, both in audience 





We are “…building an airplane [while] in flight.”5 
 
Creating a new government program is not a simple task; such programs are 
often fraught with volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. Add a fear 
of death and destruction on a national scale should the program falter or fail, and 
we have the basic environment that leaders face in achieving homeland security. 
Repetition of the mantra, “it’s not a matter of if, but when terrorists will strike 
again,” is not conducive to an atmosphere in which officials must deliberatively 
and thoughtfully create an effective and efficient government program. But the 
difficulties of the organizational development environment do not negate the 
necessity of what remains to be done. 
The federal government’s homeland security challenge consists of much more 
than simply drawing boxes and lines in a new organizational chart. For current 
homeland security leaders, under fire for trying to “build the tail section while 
soaring at 30,000 feet,” this is not breaking news. And state and local leaders do 
not get a “pass” while federal agencies struggle to create a pristine organization 
that all agree is both effective and efficient. Elected and appointed leaders in the 
nation’s urban, suburban, and rural areas are also expected to achieve a safer and 
more secure world. With respect to homeland security, they are in unique 
positions of responsibility, accountability, and ownership of resources where they 
can do more to secure the homeland than all of the federal agencies combined.  
Consider the following statements: “All disasters are local;” “The next attack 
will be stopped by a cop on the street;” “Governors have a unique constitutional 
responsibility;” and, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states 
respectively, or to the people.”6 These familiar refrains apply to homeland 
security. States and localities play a significant role, but that role is still being 
defined and is far from fully-developed. State and local officials have been asked 
to partner in this national endeavor, but without a clearly defined road map or 
any precedent processes in place, especially for the prevention of terrorist acts.  
The purpose of the MET seminars is to clarify the most important and 
essential questions and truths confronting elected leaders responsible for 
homeland security and then figure out how to answer those questions, in 
accordance with the truths. How are decisions made when the disaster far 
outstrips the resources to address it? Is intelligence fusion possible? Federal 
priorities are inherently different from state and local priorities: Who’s in charge? 
How can state and local leaders be provided with assistance for their part in the 
construction of homeland security? One way is to simply tell them what to do and 
then fund them to do it. This assumes someone knows how to “do it,” and that 
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the activities can be accomplished in an ever-changing, often-decreasing funding 
environment. But adequate financial resources are only a part of the solution; the 
rest involves policy development, organizational designs, strategic planning, 
commitment, and – most importantly – leadership. Educational assistance at the 
senior state and local levels is required. This is not to suggest that state and local 
officials do not know how to accomplish these types of tasks.  It is rather that, in 
the area of homeland security, policy, organizational structure, and strategic 
thinking are either little known or under-developed.  Additionally, the concept of 
“training” or “how to do it” assumes that there is a right way and a wrong way; 
“education” teaches people how to think critically, analyze problems and develop 
their own solutions and options. These seminars are not intended to be 
“training.” 
Take prevention as an example of the inherent educational challenge. Systems 
of prevention are far more difficult to implement than systems of response; the 
prevention of a terrorist act is not a normal or “routine” function of state and 
local governments. When they are asked to “share responsibility” to stop the next 
attack, there is an implication that an infrastructure and methodology is already 
in place. But in the vast majority of jurisdictions, plans to prevent terrorist 
attacks are non-existent, incomplete, untested, or immature. It is impossible to 
“train” to a standard, practice, or precedent that does not exist. But “education” 
can be provided to assist in a critical analysis of a problem, the options for solving 
it, and an increased awareness of its importance relative to other priorities. 
Prevention is not the only area that requires deliberative discussions, policy-
making, and resource commitments. When the subject is terrorism, public 
communications, protection of critical infrastructures, continuity of essential 
services, catastrophic response actions, and interagency and multi-jurisdictional 
coordination all present issues and problems not solved by “normal” disaster 
preparedness. These are the challenges explored during an Executive Education 
Program seminar. This is why the need for these seminars exists. 
  
THE APPROACH 
The basic objective of the MET seminar is to identify the critical homeland 
security issues that challenge state and local leaders.  The seminar team and 
elected/appointed leaders collectively define and prioritize these challenges and 
analyze their specific experiences, limitations, and capabilities. They also discuss 
the challenges common to jurisdictions throughout the nation, with a view to 
beginning or advancing strategic initiatives focused upon prevention of, 
preparedness for, response to, and recovery from a terrorist act.  It would be 
inaccurate to describe a MET as a presentation, evaluation, assessment, tactical 
training event, table-top exercise, or policy direction handed down from the 
federal government.  Nor does a seminar in and of itself solve the complex issues 
attendant upon instituting homeland security. Instead, these sessions are 
designed to be provocative, non-attributive, candid discussions and debates 
about the homeland security issues facing state and local jurisdictional leaders. 
The program’s objectives, the composition of the audiences, and the curriculum 
content are all key elements in the overall success of the program. 
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The purpose and objectives of the Executive Education Program are to: 
• Assist the jurisdictions’ executive leadership to build on their existing 
successes in Homeland Security preparedness and strengthen capacity 
to prevent and defeat terrorism. 
• Identify and examine homeland security concepts, challenges, and 
opportunities at the policy, strategy, and organizational design level. 
• Discuss opportunities, expectations, and challenges of elected officials 
and other senior leaders in implementing homeland security 
objectives. 
Within these explicit goals are also implicit and more explanatory intentions. The 
program, through an open, candid, and sometimes provocative discourse, also 
attempts to achieve these unstated objectives: 
• Make senior officials aware of their responsibilities as well as 
opportunities to participate in the prevention of terrorist attacks. 
• Clarify why they should care about homeland security, the local, state 
and federal homeland security systems, and the expectations of 
partners when something happens – i.e. who is in charge? 
• Enable jurisdictions’ senior leaders to talk collaboratively about their 
roles, responsibilities, and expectations in their pursuit of homeland 
security success. 
• Discover the more controversial, and often neglected, issues inherent 
in the response and recovery to catastrophic disasters, and share either 
“smart practices”7 observed elsewhere or more information on why 
these issues are so difficult. 
• Help the jurisdiction, and thereby the nation, “move the ball 
downfield” in their homeland security efforts by identifying the priority 
issues they need to tackle next in their efforts to protect and serve their 
citizens. 
The session results vary and are often unpredictable. In some sessions, the key 
finding for participants is a better awareness (though the lack of awareness may 
be unacknowledged by all participants beforehand) of what they already have in 
place. In other sessions, the outcome is a clear statement of priorities that the 
jurisdiction must address in near, short, and/or long term efforts. Typically, 
results include a bit of each of the above, plus the important designation of who 
in the room has the responsibility for accomplishing the most significant tasks.  
In some cases, just the fact that the program brought the particular 
participants together to discuss these issues at length for the first time marks an 
“advance of the ball.” Occasionally, there is the “aha!” or “Kodak© moment”8 
when not only is a challenging issue identified but the participants also outline 
and commit to the issues’ resolution. Successful moments have included the 
realization and commitment to form state intelligence fusion centers, the 
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agreement to pursue elected official councils on homeland security, and the idea 




Who is “doing” homeland security? While the question depends heavily on how 
“homeland security” is defined, some believe the people conducting the day-to-
day management and administration of homeland security should be those most 
involved in the executive seminars. However, underlying the program is the 
concept that “management attends to the realism of what is.  Leadership looks 
toward what could be, what “should” be.9 Consequently, the program requires 
that the jurisdiction’s executive leadership participate in the MET seminars, 
whether or not they are intimately familiar with or involved in the execution of 
homeland security activities. For example, the governor and key members of his 
or her cabinet are expected to attend state level sessions. In order to fulfill and 
promote homeland security objectives, the presence and involvement of 
leadership is essential. While management can keep the initiatives and programs 
running, only leaders can provide executive commitment, vision, strategic 
priorities, and resources. The “bosses” must be in the room and party to the 
discussion, especially the discussion of who is in charge and the potential 
assignment of responsibility for various aspects of the homeland security 
endeavor. 
The program also attempts to underscore the importance of involving non-
traditional partners in achieving homeland security objectives. Homeland 
security is about much more than just law enforcement, firefighting, and 
emergency management. It is also about public health, agriculture, public affairs, 
economics, tourism, business, tribes, legislators, judges, general services, and 
much more. The program typically strives for a balanced mix of these areas and 
an attendance limit of approximately thirty-five participants. The program 
generally works with a multi-disciplinary group, limited in number to promote an 
open discourse. 
The program utilizes a team of Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) to achieve its 
explicit and implicit objectives. The SMEs use a variety of engagement methods. 
They provide expertise, both from their personal areas of experience as well as 
from their exposure to lessons from other jurisdictions in previous sessions. They 
are provocateurs, challenging current strategies and concepts at both the national 
and jurisdictional levels. They coach and constructively criticize, offering insights 
and advice on how the jurisdiction might solve or think differently about a 
current challenge. For the most part, but not exclusively, the SMEs are selected 
from the ranks of former senior officials in order to provide an environment of 
candid and open dialogue without fear on their part of deviating from or 
contradicting any institution’s current policy positions. 
Again, the goal is to have an open exchange of views about homeland security. 
The size and composition of the audience is intentionally designed to promote 
discussion. Speeches, prepared presentations, and recitations of tactical plans are 
discouraged. Debate and questioning are encouraged, not avoided or stifled. The 
underlying premise is that we have not yet figured out homeland security, but 
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through honest and frank conversation among professionals and responsible 
officials, we can improve the policies and practices. 
 
Curriculum 
The curriculum is designed to provide a guideline for discussion that will identify 
a range of potential inquiries during the executive education seminars. These 
“interrogatories” are intended to stimulate discussions that will identify and 
clarify the policy and strategic issues and challenges faced by each client group. 
While the questions posed seemingly invite “yes” or “no” responses or 
explanations, the primary goal is to use them to promote a lively policy and issue-
identification dialogue. Sometimes the facilitator will shift the focus of a 
particular topic by asking “What is your expectation of…,” rather than “how do 
you…,” in order to elicit desired results rather than statements of current status. 
The desired interrogatories are inserted into an outline based upon the overall 
themes and direction that any particular client requires or requests. Simulated 
video news stories, “Crossfire”-type commentaries, and expert views in video 
clips are used to help highlight the issues as well as provide a dynamic context to 
the sessions.  
The topic areas are intended to focus on the policy and organizational issues 
surrounding the multi-governmental, multi-agency, and multi-disciplinary 
environment in which jurisdictions are operating in order to accomplish 
homeland security objectives. Below are examples of the topic areas and 
questions utilized by the program to stimulate discussion. Not all of these 
questions are used in every session and many other topics arise that are not listed 
here. The intent is to cultivate an agile discussion tailored to the issues relevant to 
the particular jurisdiction. 
 
 
SAMPLE OUTLINE TEMPLATE 
Inter-governmental Management and Policy Development 
• How are policies and strategies for homeland security developed, 
vetted, and approved? At what point are chief elected officials involved 
and what is expected of them? 
• What hampers or hinders cross-government agreement on goals, 
objectives, and directions for homeland security? What has been done 
to overcome these barriers? 
• How are the multiple chief elected officials, elected councils, appointed 
district executives and inter-jurisdictional disciplines engaged in policy 
setting? 
• How are essential and traditional government objectives balanced with 
those of this new demand for homeland security? How are they 
discussed and debated across jurisdictional boundaries? 
• How are trade-offs between prevention and response investments 
discussed and decided? How are homeland security efforts, particularly 
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• Who is responsible for threat identification – federal, state, or local 
governments?  The private sector? Who is involved and who is 
excluded and why? 
• Are all existing data bases and systems being utilized for surveillance 
and monitoring – e.g. police reports, driver licenses, fire inspections, 
welfare roles, health surveillance, etc? What are the barriers and is it 
worth it to overcome them? Are there any legal challenges or policy 
positions associated with Threat Identification?  If so, how are they 
being addressed? 
• What is the mechanism for integrating threat identification efforts 
across jurisdictional boundaries and among local, state, private, and 
multiple federal efforts? 
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT AND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 
• Who identifies what is critical infrastructure? How is this process 
working?  What are the key vital infrastructures and how are their 
proponents and/or owners included in the assessment process? 
• How is protection prioritization accomplished? Where resource 
decisions are made for additional protection measures? How are the 
“trade-offs” analyzed and delivered to decision makers? How is this 
handled in a multi-jurisdictional environment? 
INTELLIGENCE/INFORMATION ANALYSIS AND FUSION 
• What is the vision for a process to collect, fuse, analyze, and 
disseminate intelligence and information products? What is the status 
of intelligence and information fusion efforts? 
• Are all disciplines involved? How are public health, agriculture, ports, 
transportation, and other entities incorporated into the area’s 
intelligence collection, analysis/fusion, dissemination, and feedback 
process? Who drives or determines the end products of the fusion 
process? 
• What role does the private sector play in intelligence strategies? 
• What are the issues regarding legal authority/statutory limitations on 
gathering and sharing intelligence – e.g. open meeting/disclosure 
laws, etc.? Is there any legislation and/or ordinance pending? What 
are the pros and cons? Are legislative remedies needed? 
PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS FOR PREVENTION 
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• How is the public engaged to help with prevention and to manage 
uneasiness/fear? How is prevention information communicated to the 
public? 
• How do you deal with special populations in the prevention phase 
(cultural/language/ethnic, schools, elderly and homebound citizens)? 
• How do you talk about your prevention efforts? 
Preparedness 
• How do your priorities match up with the National Preparedness 
Priorities? Do you have other priorities? To address prevention as a 
priority, how would the area’s allocation of resources and staffing need 
to be adjusted or is it appropriate? 
• How much risk is the jurisdiction willing to accept in 
preventing/preparing for terrorist attacks?  What type of risk 
calculation is incorporated into the resource allocation decision-
making? 
• What is your strategy for enlisting the public’s support in both 
preparing for and preventing a terrorist attack? 
Catastrophic Response/Recovery 
• How would a major and catastrophic incident be managed and 
coordinated? What role will the various elected officials have in this 
management? 
• Does the city, county, or state have the authority or the need for 
authority to compel vaccination or treatment? Can the state or local 
authorities direct health care providers to exam, monitor, or treat? 
• Who has the authority to seize/use facilities or property? Who has the 
authority to quarantine a high rise building? Who has enforcement 
responsibility and authority? Who has the authority to force closure of 
facilities? Malls, schools, transportation centers? 
• How will state and federal military resources be requested and engaged 
in a catastrophic, terrorist incident? Is there a policy on the “use of 
force?” 
Continuity of Services 
• What are the jurisdictional legal obligations and responsibilities for 
COOP (Continuity of Operations) and COG (Continuity of 
Government) planning? How have the essential functions of the 
governments in the urban area been identified? 
• What would the public identify as the essential responsibilities and 
functions of government in the event of a disaster? Given that many 
essential services and functions for citizens are handled by diverse 
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local, state, federal, and private levels, how is the continuance of these 
services planned and coordinated? 
• How many of your agencies have identified their essential functions? 
Has this information been consolidated into a comprehensive plan and 
strategy? 
• What are some of the unique policy issues that will either help or 
hinder effective COOP and COG in the area? 
Risk Communications 
• What information would be released to the public? Who decides? What 
type of discussion occurs when deciding what to say and who will say 
it? 
• How will the media react? What should governors, mayors, 
commissioners, etc. expect? What media strategies should officials 
employ? How should officials communicate with the public to manage 
fear during an event? 
• At what point would federal, state, and local governments confirm to 
the public that an event is terrorist in nature? How will this message be 
coordinated?  
• What would be the public’s expectations for information and guidance? 
Before, during, and after? 
Strategic Planning and Budgeting 
• What is the long term (multi-year) strategy for guiding and directing 
homeland security goals and objectives? Is this an individual 
jurisdictional strategy or regional? 
• How will resource efforts be sustained if federal funding decreases or 
ends? Where do homeland security efforts and costs rank in the overall 
budget priority process? 
• How should the jurisdiction tie its strategy to other regional, state, and 
federal plans? Or should it? 
• How will the success of the strategic plan and consequent budget 
allocations be measured? 
While this is just a sample of the questions that might appear in a seminar 
outline, they show the level and flavor of the discussion prompts. The goal is to 
solicit discussion at the policy and strategy level and to avoid the operational or 
tactical details. The initial response(s) to any of these prompts helps lead the 
discussion towards a better clarification of the issues and sometimes towards 
potential paths for resolution.  
 
THE LESSONS (so far)10 
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The Executive Education Program has conducted sixty-nine sessions at the time 
of this writing, beginning with a state MET in New Hampshire on January 29, 
2003 and most recently, a topical MET for the Council of State Government’s 
Henry Toll Fellowship Program on July 12, 2006. There have been thirty-seven 
state METs, eleven for major urban areas, and twenty-one topical METs (the 
appendix contains a complete list of completed sessions as of July 17, 2006). The 
program has covered the United States geographically from Guam to Puerto Rico, 
Seattle to Miami and from New Hampshire to Los Angeles and Long Beach.  
So what? Has anything been learned? Are we “evolving” homeland security or 
are we constantly revisiting the same ground time and time again? Is the ball 
being moved forward? An analysis of seminar summary reports conducted in 
December 200511 found that the top five topics discussed were: (1) 
Intelligence/Fusion Centers, (2) Public Information/Outreach, (3) Private Sector, 
(4) Federal Partnership, and (5) Media and Public Health/Medical Surge (tie.)12 
The following comments represent the prevalent themes and trends observed 
over the last three and a half years’ delivery of the executive education series. 
Because they are generalizations, many of these comments do not apply equally 
to every place the program has been presented. This article looks at five areas 
critical to the execution of homeland security objectives: organization, 
prevention, preparedness, risk communications, and catastrophic response and 
recovery.  
 
Organizing for Homeland Security 
States have approached their organizational designs for homeland security 
activities in a variety of ways. There is no predominant organizational chart 
indicating a consistent approach from state to state. Some have established 
agencies, or groups of agencies called “homeland security,” while others have 
appointed individual executives to oversee efforts. Leadership or primary points 
of contact vary by discipline and agency. This lack of consistency should not 
necessarily be seen as a negative, however. First, many (if not most) other state 
agencies vary in composition, roles, and responsibilities from state to state; 
therefore, it is not surprising that homeland security structural evolutions do so 
as well. Second, states are still experimenting with their structures. Many states 
visited by the team are employing a second or third organizational construct as 
they attempt to satisfy both efficiency and political requirements. 
Finally, it does not appear that any particular organizational template leads to 
successful homeland security efforts. What appear to be the more important 
criteria for an effective state effort are the strength of the personal relationships 
among the players; the establishment of openly agreed-upon goals, objectives, 
roles, and responsibilities; and the commitment and involvement of the state’s 
governor. The presence of these three elements, regardless of the organizational 
structure, appears to be paramount in achieving homeland security goals. 
Urban areas, also varying in organizational structure, generally rely upon their 
law enforcement agencies to lead homeland security efforts. The differences 
among the urban areas we work with are mostly in the degree to which other 
jurisdictions, agencies, and disciplines are included in the overall effort. While at 
one end of the spectrum there is an almost exclusive law enforcement endeavor, 
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there are other instances where multi-jurisdictional, multi-disciplinary 
approaches are the rule. There are pros and cons to both approaches. The former 
ensures centralized decision-making and expediency in moving to action, at least 
within the areas controlled by law enforcement. But this approach excludes other 
important players, which in turn limits valuable input from and collaboration 
with other disciplines and other partner jurisdictions. The latter approach 
provides much broader collaboration and diversity, but presents challenges of 
consensus building, conflicting political demands, and a time-consuming 
decision-making process. 
So is organizational design important or irrelevant? It is important to 
organize; less important are the specific constructs upon which that organization 
is built. Organizational backbones are critical for the institutionalization of 
efforts. One constant of senior government leadership is that individuals will 
retire, be promoted, transition in an election, transfer, or be voted out of office. 
Also important, in the particular activity of homeland security, is that senior 
officials might be killed, wounded, or otherwise absent from the community of 
leadership. Deputies and subordinates can more easily step up to fill a designated 
organizational slot than they can to fill a position based solely on an established 
personal relationship. 
However, it is difficult to point to any single successful organizational design 
that does not have an unsuccessful twin somewhere else. For example, in one 
state, the placement of the emergency management organization under the 
adjutant general, who also serves as the homeland security advisor, appears 
effective and efficient.  Yet, across the state line an identical construct is 
ineffective. In other examples, the emergency manager and homeland security 
official is the same person, yet effectiveness can vary significantly. How 
individuals lead and how they relate to one another are very important – more 
important than hierarchical, static diagrams of responsibility. While states and 
local governments may reach the point in homeland security evolution where a 
smart organizational practice becomes a best practice, we are not there yet. How 
can form consistently follow function when the latter is constantly in flux?  
Why do states and cities organize differently? There are at least three 
significant reasons organizational constructs and assignments of homeland 
security leadership may differ between states and localities: resource 
opportunities, proximity to the front lines, and perceived defaults of 
responsibility.  
Resource Opportunities. In general, states have more government agencies and 
larger staffs than do cities and local governments. Responsibility for the range of 
state-level homeland security activities could arguably fit in any number of boxes. 
In practice, the options include assignment of homeland security to the adjutant 
general, the emergency management director, the lieutenant governor, the public 
safety director, the attorney general, the state police leader, or the creation of a 
new agency or position. There are advantages to any of these choices. Cities and 
other local governments simply do not have these options or staff resources; 
generally, though not exclusively, local law enforcement is the more robust 
agency for homeland security leadership, from a resource point of view. 
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Proximity to the Front Lines. For the most part, state agencies are not 
predominantly comprised of first responders or first preventers. States have an 
enormous role to play in homeland security, but the roles of “boots on the 
ground” prevention and response activities rest largely with the localities.  
Therefore, the decision regarding the assignment of homeland security 
leadership at the state level can be more discretionary, as opposed to a 
municipality where intelligence, protection, surveillance, first response, and 
other counter-criminal activities reside mostly in one discipline. 
Perceived Defaults of Responsibility. Who owns homeland security? One could 
argue that a state’s responsibility for homeland security is predominantly 
counter-criminal, emergency response, military, general public safety, or an issue 
of executive policy: The default is not clear at the state level. But in a local setting, 
where homeland security is perceived in terms of “stop the terrorist and if not, 
get the lights and sirens moving,” the perceived default of responsibility most 
often falls on either the law enforcement or emergency management community.  
 
To conclude and summarize the lessons we have learned with regard to 
organizing homeland security: (1) There is not yet a convincing argument for any 
one organizational design for homeland security; (2) Good personal 
relationships, agreed upon roles and responsibilities amongst the leaders and 
players in homeland security, and executive commitment contribute significantly 
to effectiveness; and (3) States and local governments are going to organize their 
homeland security function differently, for a variety of reasons. 
 
Prevention 
As stated earlier, the MET sessions purposely focus on the prevention elements of 
homeland security. These discussions walk participants through risk analysis 
factors (threat, vulnerability, and consequence), intelligence processes, 
preparedness for prevention, and protection/threat response. At times this 
portion of the seminar can be tedious and non-participatory. Why? As mentioned 
in the introduction, suddenly to become responsible and accountable for the 
prevention of terrorist attacks is a novelty for state and local governments. 
Getting senior executives to talk about something outside their comfort and 
experience zone is not always easy. But in this case, it is the issue. One governor, 
in one of our first seminars, stated in effect that he never wanted to have to deal 
with the catastrophic destruction resulting from a terrorist attack; his priority 
was to stop an attack from happening in the first place. State and local 
governments are all trying to discover how to “do” prevention without precedent 
or experience. 
Prevention as a doctrine, strategy, and infrastructural effort is just beginning 
to grow what might be called institutional “roots.” The establishment of 
information and intelligence fusion centers has been increasing over the past few 
years, but these centers are still not prevalent or consciously designed as 
comprehensive networks. Allowing the fusion-process effort to evolve naturally 
(or without institutional guidance) is not necessarily a bad outcome for the long 
term; it will simply take time. Most states and many urban centers have 
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acknowledged the importance of some type of multi-disciplinary, multi-
jurisdictional process to “put the pieces of the puzzle together.” The primary 
challenges faced by state and local governments in this area appear to be in 
providing resources for these infrastructures, responding to civil liberty issues, 
and justifying the investment of resources in the absence of attacks. Other 
challenges faced by state and local governments include the lack of full 
participation on the part of many non-traditional players in intelligence and 
prevention efforts. This includes a lack of representation from the health, 
agricultural, emergency management, business (both infrastructure and 
economic aspects), tourism, and even environmental disciplines. Efforts to 
include these groups have been successful in too few cases. 
While much criticism is directed at the federal government for little (or one-
way) information and intelligence flow, no level of government has solved this 
problem. Local governments often have similar complaints about state efforts, 
first responders accuse parent agencies of a lack of communication, and non-law 
enforcement disciplines feel out of the loop at all levels. There are a few shining 
examples that address pieces of this overall challenge, but a complete and 
comprehensive “enterprise approach” to information sharing has not yet been 
observed. On a positive note, state and urban area fusion centers are continuing 
to multiply and evolve and in some cases beginning to interconnect with each 
other. The future of fusion centers is unclear in the absence of a terrorist attack; 
justifying the staff and expense of an endeavor where success is judged by the 
absence of disaster is politically difficult. It is especially difficult when this 
particular prevention endeavor is perceived as impinging on civil liberties. 
Success in the further proliferation and capability of fusion centers may rest 
largely on the ability to show “two-fer” (two for the cost of one) benefits – e.g. 
that fusion centers can be a benefit in the battle against all crimes, or even all 
hazards, not just terrorism. 
Finally, looking at the entire system or model for prevention, from risk 
analysis to threat response and all of the sub-elements, one would be hard- 
pressed to find a state or local effort that has tied it all together in some type of 
enterprise approach (i.e. established a joint and unified effort across multiple 
agencies, levels of government, and the private sector, all contributing resources 
and taking responsibility for connected pieces of the overall methodology). While 
this may be an unrealistic expectation, the vision is there to be pursued. Good 
public arguments for prevention investments at the state and local government 
levels must be found and delivered. As in the case of fusion centers, overall 
prevention efforts may suffer from budget and political disinterest in the face of 
unprovable success.  
 
Preparedness 
While the seven national preparedness priorities were published only in the last 
year or so, observations from the MET sessions suggest two conclusions. First, 
the priorities are, and have been, consistent with the priorities of state and local 
efforts. Second, each jurisdiction may place greater weight or effort on one 
priority or another. To a large extent, the seven priorities for homeland security 
have been validated by the state and urban-area participants. From the 
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perspectives of individual agencies and disciplines, however, traditional priorities 
remain the same (e.g. fire fighters fight fires, police officers patrol and arrest, 
etc.). Balancing traditional governmental priorities with the new priorities of 
homeland security appears to be the great challenge. This is not to say there is an 
aversion to the new priorities (some would say they are not even new); it is more 
a question of how to effectively accomplish both the new and traditional at the 
same time, even with additional federal funding. 
Another observation revolves around the need to practice and prepare to 
prevent. How do you exercise prevention? What does a fusion center tabletop 




The focus of risk communications discussions appears to be on incident public 
information or “how we talk to the media and the public” during an emergency. 
The MET seminars also reveal a need for methods and guidelines for pre-event 
risk communications. Effectively informing the public of prevention and 
preparedness efforts, their role, and the engagement of the media in 
preparedness phases are important efforts that require training, tools, and 
further education. The consensus is that the management of both public fear and 
the media is most effectively done well before an event occurs. An element of 
political risk is recognized here, along with an awareness that such a program 
must be carefully implemented. Publicly talking about the bad things that could 
happen, even accompanied with information on how these things can be avoided 
or resolved, is not a welcome activity to elected officials and their subordinates. 
Jurisdictions also appear to acknowledge that in cases of pandemic flu, bio-
terrorism, and other events of mass disruption, much of the response effort is 
dedicated to managing the reactions of those unaffected by the emergency, not 
just those who are infected, injured, or killed.  
Participants see a possible advantage in utilizing unofficial spokespeople and 
preparedness advocates whose words will resonate more strongly with the public 
than those of elected and senior government officials. Communications from 
church and community leaders, celebrities, and educators may have a greater 
public impact, with respect to both preparedness messages and emergency action 
recommendations, than those delivered by public sector officials. The 
combination and coordination of official and unofficial methods of delivery could 
be the most effective course of action. However, this potential improvement will 
challenge those in charge of the ongoing effort towards unified message 
development and delivery. Most jurisdictions attending the METs seminars have 
accepted, possess, or are implementing Joint Information Systems and Centers 
(JIS/JIC.) But these efforts and structures primarily address single or 
geographically-limited incidents and primarily only in the emergency response 
phase. Consistent messaging to the public is important in the preparedness and 
imminent-threat phase as well, and to a wider geographical audience. But current 
employments of JIS/JICs cannot solve this issue; they are designed and used for 
tactical and operational responses rather than strategic messaging. 
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Response and Recovery 
The post-Katrina and pre-Pandemic Flu environment has significantly increased 
the desire to discuss the more difficult policy and strategic issues that arise 
during the occurrence of catastrophic events. The seminars and sessions 
purposely steer away from those issues that are traditional and, for the most part, 
already solved. (Senior executives do not need the MET team to have a discussion 
of the jurisdiction’s standard procedures for their emergency response system.) 
The executive education program presents and solicits discussion on some of the 
harder, if not impossible, issues that emerge during a catastrophic scenario. 
Examples of the topics discussed by the participants include: rules of engagement 
for the enforcement of quarantine, seizure of private property, lines of succession, 
and use of force in an evacuation. 
The most challenging – and most often unresolved – of these is the use of force 
and rules of engagement for public health or general peace and order events. 
Most jurisdictions acknowledge that, in cases of isolation or quarantine, 
discussions have occurred between health and law enforcement agencies 
pertaining to the importance of coordination. But when the first layer of the 
onion is peeled away, there has been little policy development regarding how 
isolation or quarantine will be enforced. How much force is appropriate and who 
makes this policy? If state police or National Guard forces become engaged, do 
they know, acknowledge, and adhere to a local jurisdiction’s policies? Should 
they? What about federal forces sent in to supplement state and local efforts? 
What about actions on international borders? This particular policy issue 
desperately needs further national discussion. Most, if not all, catastrophic-level 
scenarios will present this decision requirement, yet the issue’s pre-disaster 
analysis, debate, and option development appears to be minimal at all levels of 
government. 
Most jurisdictional senior executives attending the METs seminars appear to  
be well prepared for the vast majority of disasters (and the inherent policy issues) 
they can reasonably expect to face. It is the catastrophic event, the rare but 
possible calamity that presents policy issues that have never been discussed or  
involve inadequate or non-existent analyses and options. For example, attacks 
with weapons of mass destruction combine unknown technical variables with 
unprecedented public fear to create decision-making environments that are 
rarely experienced or exercised by senior executives. Preparedness for the social, 
as opposed to the medical, impact of a public health disaster are just now being 
debated, discussed, and planned for. A recommendation made by several 
jurisdictions is to provide exercises for officials that focus more on the 
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The comments and observations related here merely skim the surface of the 
discussions and recommendations that have emerged from the sixty-nine MET 
seminars held to date. The results of 266 hours of discussion, with over 2,000 
officials over three years, resulted in a much longer list of recommendations and 
concerns than described above. Another observer of these sessions may, and 
should, stress other findings, trends, and perspectives. Frankly, an article could 
be written on each of these areas.  
Nevertheless, two critical points can be made: (1) learning is needed; and (2) 
learning is occurring. Education is the key to success for senior officials at this 
stage of our homeland security evolution. Every administration leaves its mark by 
advancing the evolution of policies and strategies a bit more. Education helps 
those involved to define the policies and strategic issues to focus upon and 
presents options and approaches for further analysis. The Executive Education 
Program’s sessions have demonstrated that the method utilized by the 
Department of Homeland Security and Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for 
Homeland Defense and Security is one promising approach to satisfying the need 
to educate senior officials in this new endeavor we call homeland security.     
The ball is being moved downfield. States, local governments, federal agencies, 
and the private sector have all been engaged in this effort. The greatest challenge 
appears to be that the road to homeland security “success” must be built while 
these public officials are sprinting down the pavement. This is the primary value 
of the Executive Education Program’s sessions: it provides a break point in this 
journey, allowing these officials to evaluate where they have been and to 
hopefully plot out their next steps. It also helps to “institutionalize” homeland 
security efforts and provides a resource for new leaders and administrations. 
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Executive Education Program 
State METs 
Urban Area METs 
Executive Education Topical Seminars 
As of July 17, 2006 
 
(Author’s Note:  While exact attendance figures were not kept for all events, an estimate of 





State MET Conducted 
1. New Hampshire January 29, 2003 
2. South Carolina May 8, 2003 
3. Alabama July 1, 2003 
4. Georgia August 1, 2003 
5. Iowa August 26, 2003 
6. Wisconsin September 12, 2003 
7. Tennessee October 15, 2003 
8. North Dakota November 4, 2003 
9. Indiana December 10, 2003 
10. Illinois April 16,  2004 
11. Maine May 18, 2004 
12. Connecticut June 8,  2004 
13. NGA/Seattle July 19, 2004 
14. New Jersey August 17, 2004 
15. Pennsylvania August 23, 2004 
16. Colorado September 20, 2004 
17.  Pacific Basin, Honolulu, HI (Governors and 
officials from Hawaii, Guam, America 
Samoa, and Northern Marianas) 
September 27, 2004 
18.  Ohio October 8, 2004 
19.  Wyoming October 20, 2004 
20. Arkansas December 14, 2004 
21. Iowa 2 December 16, 2004 
22. Oklahoma March 4, 2005 
23. Connecticut 2 March 16, 2005 
24. Arizona April 16, 2005 
25. Washington State May 9, 2005 
26. Utah June 20, 2005 
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27. Pacific Basin HS - Kona, HI (Governors and 
officials from HI, Guam, America Samoa, and 
Northern Marianas) 
August 11-12, 2005 
 
28. Washington State – Operationalizing Policy 
at the Agency Level 
August 24, 2005 
29. California September 9, 2005 
30. Puerto Rico September 15, 2005 
31. Georgia – Private and Public Sector Focus October 6, 2005 
32.  North Carolina March 15, 2006 
33. California 2 April 20, 2006 
34.  Louisiana (Hurricane) May 16, 2006 
35. Ohio (Bio - Pan Flu) June 13, 2006 
36.  Arizona Governor’s Public-Private Sector June 24, 2006 
37. Guam July 6, 2006 
 
URBAN AREA METS 
 
State MET Conducted  
1.  Seattle, WA April 25, 2005 
2. National Capital Region, Washington, DC June 1, 2005 
3. Phoenix, AZ June 16, 2005 
4. Atlanta, GA November 14, 2005 
5. Salt Lake City, UT December 7, 2005 
6. Jacksonville, FL February 9, 2006 
7. Los Angeles and Long Beach, CA February 22, 2006 
8.  Cincinnati, OH March 9, 2006 
9.  New Haven, CT March 21, 2006 
10. San Francisco, CA April 19, 2006 





Topic Location MET Conducted  
1.  Continuity of 




Des Moines, Iowa January 8, 2004 
2. HS in Rural America Somerset, KY March 8, 2004 
3. Intelligence and 
Information Sharing 
Hartford, CT (HS directors 
and officials from the 
Northeast) 
November 10, 2004 
4. “Pacific Cloud” 
Hollywood 
Hollywood, CA (Sec. Ridge 
and Federal and Los Angeles 
December 15, 2004 
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Officials and Hollywood 
Executives – Academy Awards 
Exercise) 
5. Nat’l Assoc for 
Attorney Generals – 
Public Health Legal 
Authorities  
Lansing, MI April 20, 2005 
6. Nat’l HS Consortium 
(State HS directors and 
officials from national 
public safety and 
governmental 
associations) 
Monterey, CA May 24, 2005 
7. Council of State 
Governments - 
Executive Council and 
Public Safety 
Committee leaders 
Lake Tahoe, CA June 6, 2005 
8. National Sheriffs 
Association 
Louisville, KY June 29, 2005 
9. CA Dept. of Food & 
Agriculture – Agro-T 
Sacramento, CA September 8, 2005 
10.National Sheriffs 
Association 
Miami, FL November 6, 2005 
11. CHDS Katrina 
Review 
Washington, DC November 8, 2005 
12. Multi-State Agro-
Terrorism Seminar 
with Univ. of Minnesota 
Chicago, IL (10 states 
participated) 
November 15, 2005 
 
13. Pandemic Flu 
Preparedness Forum 
with Univ. of Texas 
Houston, TX November 28, 2005 
14. Homeland Security 
Consortium (State HS 
directors and officials 





Phoenix, AZ December 2, 2005 




Washington, DC January 24-25, 2006 
16. Nat’l Lt. Governors 
Association 
Washington DC February 6, 2006 
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17.  NEMA Public 
Affairs Roundtable 
Session 
Washington, DC February 13, 2006 
18.  MT Governor’s 
Conference - Elected 
Officials MET 
Billings, MT May 23, 2006 




Lanai, Hawaii June 20, 2006 
20.  Guam Risk 
Communications and 
Health Emergencies 
Hagatna, Guam July 5, 2006 
21. CSG Henry Toll 
Fellowship 
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